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Abstract
Climate change and energy security are driving a worldwide renaissance in nuclear power. An Australian nuclear power
industry has also been seriously investigated by the Australian government and its agencies. This paper provides a
broad overview of the nuclear fuel cycle and the nuclear power industry. It identifies aspects that are sensitive to
nuclear terrorism and nuclear weapons proliferation to help security professionals identify threats and prepare for a
possible Australian nuclear power industry.
Keywords
nuclear power, energy security, uranium, radiation

INTRODUCTION
It has been fairly widely accepted for decades in the scientific community that massive amounts of carbon dioxide
(CO2) emitted into the atmosphere by humans would increase the “greenhouse effect” resulting in global warming and
other climate change. The most recent fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC, 2007) makes it clear that carbon dioxide is the most important anthropogenic greenhouse gas affecting the
Earth’s energy balance, with the primary source being the burning of fossil fuels (coal, oil and gas). A global warming
of 0.2˚C per decade is projected over the next two decades and rises of several degrees this century are expected if CO2
emissions are not reduced.
In Australia, over 96% of electricity generation (in terms of fuel inputs) is from coal, gas and oil (ABARE, 2009a).
Hydroelectricity is our main “clean” electricity generation source which does not emit carbon dioxide. Although
significant growth is likely in other “renewable” sources like wind generators, these are currently not suitable for base
load power. Nuclear power plants can supply large amounts of base load power and do not emit greenhouse gases. With
Australia’s natural wealth in uranium the nuclear option is being promoted, by some, as a “clean” source of base load
power and an effective medium term action to reduce climate change.
The year 2006 was pivotal in Australia with a nuclear power industry being seriously investigated through two
comprehensive reports. The first report was commissioned by the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology
Organisation (ANSTO) to look at the economics of nuclear power in the Australian context (Gittus, 2006). In the
second half of the year, a taskforce was appointed by the Prime Minister to investigate and report on uranium mining,
value-added processing, and the contribution of a nuclear energy industry in Australia (Commonwealth of Australia,
2006). In summary, while high commercial and technology barriers could make Australian conversion, enrichment and
fuel fabrication facilities difficult to build, there was support for an expansion of uranium mining, and nuclear power
was considered economically feasible. The release in late 2006 of Al Gore’s academy award winning documentary film
on climate change “An Inconvenient Truth” (2006), enhanced public perceptions of a crisis that is driving the debate on
nuclear power in Australia.
Despite having huge natural energy resources, Australia could find its energy security under threat from the
international community that may not accept our huge carbon footprint. Australia has recently overtaken the United
States of America as the world’s biggest emitter of CO2 per capita (Maplecroft, 2009), and globally enforced carbon
emission caps may emerge as part of a global response to climate change. Australia may be forced to quickly reduce our
reliance on fossil fuels or face sanction.
This paper provides a broad overview of the nuclear power industry with the nuclear fuel cycle described in sufficient
detail for security professionals to better appreciate security issues. Reference will be made to those aspects of most
concern for nuclear terrorism and nuclear weapons proliferation. Regulation, safeguards and international experience
are also addressed.
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NUCLEAR FUEL
Overview
Figure 1 shows a schematic diagram of the nuclear fuel cycle for nuclear fission power reactors. The front end of the
nuclear reactor can be considered as two stages. Firstly, uranium ore is mined and processed to produce yellowcake
(U3O8). This normally occurs at or near the mine site. Secondly, specialist facilities are needed to enrich uranium and
produce fuel that a nuclear power station can use to produce electricity. Finally, the spent fuel is managed through
storage, reprocessing and waste disposal.
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Figure 1. Schematic diagram of nuclear fission power reactor fuel cycle
Uranium ore to yellowcake
Australia has the world’s largest known recoverable uranium deposits (23%) in the world with major producers Canada
and Kazakhstan account for about 60% of world supply of uranium for nuclear reactors from mines (World Nuclear
Association, 2009). Natural uranium on Earth is radioactive and made up of 99.3% U-238 and just 0.7% U-235. Both
U-238 and U-235 are alpha particle emitters with half lives of 4.5 billion years and 704 million years respectively
(Thornton and Rex, 2006). The long half lives and dispersed nature of the uranium deposits make them not particularly
radioactive. In the financial year 2007/2008, the three currently operating Australian mines at Ranger (NT), Olympic
Dam (SA), and a small mine at Beverly (SA), produced a total of 10,101 tonnes of yellowcake (ABARE, 2009b).
Yellowcake has a low specific radioactivity and is transported in 200 litre drums and loaded into shipping containers for
enrichment overseas. World uranium mining will probably need to greatly expand in the coming decades due to an
increasing number of nuclear power stations and a probable reduction in (currently 40%) nuclear fuel derived from
decommissioned American and Russian nuclear warheads (ASNO, 2008) under the Treaty on the Reduction and
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START).
Conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication
Through chemical reactions, yellowcake (U3O8) is converted to uranium hexafluoride (UF6) before the technologically
challenging task of enriching the U-235 abundance from its natural 0.7% to between 3% and 5%. This is necessary for
use in almost all nuclear power reactors as it is the U-235 isotope that is fissile and can therefore produce energy.
Whilst other enrichment methods have been used in the past or are under development, the centrifuge method now
dominates the international uranium enrichment industry. When uranium hexafluoride is fed into a swiftly rotating
cylinder (centrifuge) there is a slight separation of the isotopes with the lighter 235UF6 having a slightly higher
concentration near the axis and the heavier 238UF6 having a slightly higher concentration in the outer regions. By
withdrawing uranium hexafluoride from near the axis and repeating the process through a series of centrifuges the
uranium hexafluoride can be enriched to reactor grade. The centrifuge method requires about one tenth of the energy
required in the diffusion method that was common up to the 1970s. Urenco have been building a national enrichment
facility in New Mexico to supply the US market using state of the art centrifuge technology with first production
expected towards the end of 2009 (Urenco, 2009). After enrichment, uranium hexafluoride is converted to uranium
dioxide (UO2) pellets for use as fuel in nuclear power reactors. Further details can be found in Bennet and Thomson
(1989).
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Enrichment of the U-235 isotope to between 3% and 20% is referred to as low-enriched uranium. Greater than 20% is
high-enriched uranium with more than 90% considered weapons grade. Commercial enrichment technology and
expertise could be fairly easily adapted to produce weapons grade uranium for use in a nuclear weapons program. Much
effort is therefore devoted to restricting this highly sensitive dual use technology as a critical step in preventing the
proliferation of nuclear weapons.
The usually unwanted U-235 deficient tails, known as depleted uranium, does have uses in other areas due to its
chemical properties and high specific gravity of 18.7. It is found in counterweights (including keels of yachts) and in
highly penetrating anti-tank ammunition.

NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS AND SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT
Nuclear power plants
The World Nuclear Association (2009, August) reported that there are 436 operating nuclear power plants worldwide
generating 372 GW of electricity. The two most common reactor types are the Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR) and
the Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) with 260 and 92 plants respectively (Hore-Lacy, 2003). A succinct and up to date
overview of current and proposed nuclear reactor types can be found in Norman, Worrall and Hesketh (2007).
At the heart of nuclear power is the induced fission process that occurs in the reactor core. When U-235 absorbs a
thermal (slow) neutron, the compound U-236 nucleus created quickly splits into two daughter nuclei and two or three
neutrons. One example of a neutron induced U-235 fission reaction is given below.
1
0

236
141
92
1
n  235
92 U  92 U  56 Ba  36 Kr  3 0 n  Energy

There are two important aspects to the nuclear fission reaction. Firstly the energy produced from U-235 fission is
enormous and over a million times more than that produced by burning the same mass of coal. The daily requirements
for a 1000MW power plant is about 3 kilograms of U-235 compared with about 8 million kilograms of coal (Thornton
and Rex, 2006). Secondly, the fission produces neutrons that, when slowed down (moderated), may be absorbed by
other U-235 nuclei to produce a self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction. Details of how the nuclear reaction is controlled,
neutrons moderated, and heat energy transferred away to electrical generators can be found in most university level
physics textbooks including those by Thornton and Rex (2006), Serway and Jewett (2008), and Halliday, Resnick and
Walker (2008).
In addition to power reactors, there are over 250 research reactors in the world where the two primary functions are to
produce high flux neutron beams for material science research and (through irradiation) manufacture
radiopharmaceuticals for nuclear medicine. Some of these reactors use high-enriched uranium of up to 95% U-235,
which unfortunately is also suitable for nuclear weapons. The new Australian research reactor, OPEL, uses lowenriched uranium (just) of 20%, which improves security and nuclear safeguards (ANSTO, 2005). Research reactors
typically require higher enrichment than reactors optimised for commercial power generation. In addition, there are
breeder reactors (Thornton and Rex, 2006) where fast neutrons from U-235 fission are absorbed by U-238, which then
beta decays to produce (breed) Plutonium (Pu-239) that is also fissile. Inherent problems with breeder reactors make
them relatively uncommon.
Spent fuel management: storage and reprocessing
After 1-2 years, the used (or spent) nuclear fuel elements need to be removed from the reactor. Typically this used fuel
is about 95% U-238, 1% Pu-239 (from transmutation of U-238 when a fast neutron is absorbed), 1% U-235, and 3%
fission waste products (World Nuclear Association, n.d.). These waste products are highly radioactive and would be
most dangerous if they were acquired by terrorists. Interim storage on site in large cooling ponds is required for several
years to provide radiation protection, remove heat from further fission events, and (with the decay of short life
radioactive isotopes) make the material easier to handle later.
The spent fuel is either moved for reprocessing (after a few years of interim storage) or is left as waste until final waste
storage facilities are ready. Although technologies for storing waste more permanently are being developed, the current
thinking is to place suitably sealed waste in deep and stable geological repositories. Former Australian Prime Minister
Bob Hawke has recently called on Australia to consider developing a nuclear waste industry that could be a source of
income and contribute to energy security worldwide given geologically safe and remote storage options (The
Australian, 2009).
Reprocessing begins with the dissolving of spent fuel rods in acid to separate uranium and plutonium from the 3%
waste products from the fission (World Nuclear Association, n.d.). These waste products are highly radioactive and
require long term storage in drums. The uranium recovered can be recycled by going through the conversion and
enrichment process again. It can also be used with the plutonium, which like uranium also produces energy through
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neutron induced fission, to produce mixed oxide (MOX) fuel rods. One of many safeguards in a reprocessing plant is to
avoid storing separated plutonium by mixing in a 50/50 ratio with uranium (Pickett, 2008)

SAFETY, NON-PROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR TERRORISM
Nuclear weapons: U-235 or Pu-239?
Plutonium has clear advantages over uranium for the construction and delivery of nuclear weapons. Firstly, Pu-239 can
undergo induced fission more easily than U-235 as it captures both slow and fast neutrons. Secondly, the Pu-239 fission
reaction also produces on average 2.7 neutrons per fission compare with 2.3 neutrons for U-235. A runaway chain
reaction is therefore easier to create for Pu-239 which allows for the development of smaller nuclear warheads that can
be more easily delivered by ballistic missiles where size and shape are critical. Pu-239 is an alpha emitter with a half
life of 24 thousand years and is highly toxic.
Pakistan and the Khan network
The case of Pakistan and the Kahn network is illustrative of how easily technology and expertise can proliferate across
international borders (Nuclear Engineering International Magazine, 2004). Back in the 1970’s, Pakistan began acquiring
enrichment technology including the design details for advanced Zippe-type centrifuges (after German Scientist Gernot
Zippe) from a European enrichment facility operated by Urenco. Pakistan was able to develop its own enrichment
capability and successfully tested a nuclear fission bomb in 1998. It is believed that this technology, through the Abdul
Khan network, was sold on the black market to Libya, North Korea and Iran. Although Libya has since renounced its
nuclear program, North Korea announced its first successful nuclear fission bomb test on October 9, 2006, and Iran,
despite UN sanctions (UN Security Council, 2008), is expanding its uranium enrichment capabilities. Other Middle
Eastern countries are also investigating the nuclear option.
Regulation and safeguards
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established in 1957 as an independent organisation within the
United Nations (UN) to promote safe, secure and peaceful nuclear technologies. The three main pillars of nuclear
cooperation that underpin its mission are the promotion of safeguards and verification, safety and security, and science
and technology. The IAEA has also responded to recent terrorist attacks through its coordination and strengthening of
international approaches to promote nuclear security (IAEA, 2007).
Diversion of nuclear material and technology in the nuclear power industry to nuclear weapons programs is and has
been a major problem and concern of the international community. The 1968 Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Treaty (NPT) aimed to restrict nuclear weapons to the five nuclear powers at the time: USA, Soviet Union (now
Russia), China, France and the United Kingdom. Since the NPT came into force in 1970, India, Pakistan and North
Korea have conducted nuclear weapons tests, Israel is believed to be a nuclear power and Iran is believed to be close to
becoming a nuclear power. India, Pakistan and Israel have never been signatories to the NPT. South Africa was a small
nuclear power before deciding to voluntarily disarm and Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus also briefly possessed
nuclear weapons (Doyle, 2008). Given that much nuclear technology and expertise is common to the nuclear power
industry and nuclear weapons programs, it has always been difficult for the IAEA, as the international body responsible,
to inspect and verify solely peaceful intentions or operations. Additional protocols have been introduced to strengthen
the non-proliferation safeguards in the NPT, but there was no general agreement to make these compulsory at the last
five-yearly NPT review conference (NPT Review Conference, 2005). In September 2009 United States President
Barack Obama chaired an historic summit of the security council which adopted resolution 1887 (2009) with 14 heads
of state for broad progress on long-stalled efforts to staunch the proliferation of nuclear weapons and ensure reductions
in existing weapons stockpiles, as well as control over fissile material (UN Security Council SC/9746, 2009).
In Australia, the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) within the Federal Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade (DFAT) is charged with ensuring that nuclear materials and items are used only for authorised
purposes and that our international treaty commitments, including the NPT, are met. ASNO also reports to the IAEA
and arranges site visits. Australia’s nuclear reactor at Lucas heights and three uranium mines with associated storage
and transport operations are major responsibilities for ASNO. An Australian nuclear power industry would result in a
huge increase in the storage and transport of radioactive materials. Further details of ASNO’s role can be obtained in
the 2007-2008 Annual Report (ASNO, 2008). Note that health and safety relating to radiation is mostly regulated by the
Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA, 2009).
Proliferation and nuclear terrorism
Access to enrichment technology and expertise is the biggest stumbling block in producing the highly enriched U-235
required for a uranium bomb from uranium ore. Reprocessing technology of spent fuel rods from power reactors is
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critical to extracting the Pu-239 required for the more versatile Plutonium bomb. It would seem logical that
international and domestic concerns for the proliferation of nuclear weapons may limit the scope of an Australian
nuclear power industry. However, a key finding of the second report (Commonwealth of Australia, 2006) is that
increased Australian involvement in the fuel cycle would not change the proliferation risks or make Australia’s energy
grid more vulnerable to terrorist attack. Given international experience the author does not agree with this finding with
respect to proliferation risks.
A nuclear power industry would create additional sources of highly radioactive material that would need to be secured
at nuclear facilities and in transportation between facilities around the country. This material could be diverted for use
in a Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) to harm and terrorise a population. Natural disasters and accidental human
intervention can also result in the dispersal of radioactive material (Swan, 2008). The ability to detect small amounts of
radioactivity in a range of situations has become a bigger priority with increasing resources being allocated to tackle the
problem. For example, in 2007 the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) of the US Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) announced 10 contracts worth US$8.8 million to perform exploratory research in advanced nuclear
detection technology (DHS, 2007)
The difficulties of ensuring that access to sensitive information, materials, technology and critical people are
appropriately controlled would be a substantial and complex undertaking for security professionals. For example, major
infrastructure, like nuclear power plants and enrichment facilities would require high level physical security and
effective policies and procedures for materials and personnel. Transportation of sensitive/dangerous materials over large
distances is an issue and the monitoring and guarding of highly radioactive waste in remote depositories would also
need to be addressed.

AN AUSTRALIAN NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY?
The British Prime Minister recently signalled that he would like Britain to play a major role in building an extra 1,000
nuclear power stations around the world (The Independent, 2008). However, the change of federal government (from
Coalition to Labour) in late 2007 has reduced the likelihood of Australia building nuclear power stations in the near
future, although there is growing pressure within the ALP to more seriously revisit this option in response to climate
change. In any case, the Australian uranium mining industry is preparing for rapid expansion and according to two
recent comprehensive reports (Gittus, 2006 ; Commonwealth of Australia, 2006) nuclear power is a realistic option for
Australia.
The ANSTO report (Gittus, 2006) concludes that nuclear power is demonstrably the safest way of generating electricity
and is an excellent source of supplies. It is reported that the fatality rate per unit of electricity is one thousand times as
great for coal, oil and gas than it is for nuclear. It is estimated that although the risk of a terrorist attack on an Australian
nuclear power station is 50% higher since 9-11, the risk is still very low. This paper seeks to broadly identify critical
segments in the nuclear fuel cycle for terrorism and/or proliferation that have the potential to cause great harm. The
overall security risks are significant and would need to be mitigated.
Australia’s current role in the world nuclear power industry is that of a major miner of uranium ore and exporter of
yellowcake. Australia has no conversion or enrichment capability, no fuel fabrication facility, no nuclear power stations
and no reprocessing facilities. Our reactor expertise revolves around the scientific use of one small research reactor at
Lucas Heights near Sydney. An Australian nuclear power industry would require a huge influx of technology, expertise,
and radioactive materials which together would have far reaching and complex security implications. Adapting from
international best practice where possible, there would be a need to develop expertise for the Australian context to
provide security for whatever segment of the nuclear industry we chose to develop. Finally, nuclear power is one of
many highly politicised issues in Australia and that some elements of the community may choose to inflate or deflate
public perception of risks to suit their own purposes.
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